主讲人：汪浩教授（北京大学国家发展研究院）

主持人：王晓辉副教授（辽宁大学新华国际商学院副院长）

嘉宾介绍：余淼杰教授（辽宁大学党委副书记、校长）

讲座点评：何真瑜助理教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

时间：2023年4月11日（周二）  15：30-17：00（北京时间）

地点：辽宁大学蒲河校区校部办公楼317

线上地点：腾讯会议128  717 532

语言：中文/英文

摘要：I consider a war of attrition game with complete information in which N ≥ 2 players compete for N−K prizes. When K=1, the game typically has a nondegenerate equilibrium in which the players’ strategies follow exponential distributions. The duration of the game tends to increase with the number of players. Given the number of players, the expected duration is linear to the harmonic mean of the players’ ‘strengths’. The equilibrium surely exists when N = 2. When N ≥ 3, it exists only when the weakest player is not too weak compared to the average. If it exists, the equilibrium is unique under some conditions. When K ≥ 2, the game typically has nondegenerate equilibria in which K−1 players give up immediately. The model can be extended to the case with interdependent valuations or ‘defeats’. An application of the model is on an N-bidder all-pay auction with ascending bids.

  主讲人简介

汪浩，北京大学国家发展研究院教授，《经济学（季刊）》副主编，Ohio State University经济学博士。主要研究兴趣为产业组织、定价策略、零售、反垄断与政府规制。研究成果发表于Management Science, Marketing Science, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy等经济学国际顶尖期刊和《世界经济》，《经济学（季刊）》等国内顶尖期刊。